



FIGHTING AGAINST INMATES' RADICALIZATION

Project number: 763538 — FAIR — JUST-AG-2016/JUST-AG-2016-03

Risk Indicators of Radicalisation in Prisons

EU FAIR Report on risk indicators to detect the radicalised detainees and
detainees at risk of radicalisation D22





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Introduction

This manual provides information for prison staff about the indicators and signs that a prisoner is becoming radicalised. Its aim is to support professionals working in prison or collaborating with prisons: warders, parole/probation officers, social workers, psychologists, religious leaders, doctors, voluntary workers, prison teachers and educators, management staff and others. There are great differences between penitentiary systems, prisons and professional roles within prisons between European countries. In addition to this document, FAIR has also produced an inventory of inspiring practices of work in prisons in relation to the issue of radicalisation, with a description of the national context of the specific countries. This helps to place this document in perspective.

This manual on risk indicators builds on the work of the results of the European project TERRA (TERRA Toolkit, 2014). Under TERRA, manuals were developed for various target groups, including prison staff, on how to identify signs of a risk that someone is radicalising. The work of TERRA was supervised by professor Fathali Moghaddam, professor of psychology at Georgetown University U.S.A and author of the model of the Staircase to Terrorism which is widely used as guiding material for professionals working with persons at risk of radicalising. Other advisers for the material were Maajid Nawaz, former radical and co-founder of the Quilliam Foundation (London U.K.) the first think tank on countering violent extremism, Lorenzo Vidino, professor at George Washington University U.S.A. and the Rt Hon Ms Hazel Blears, former Minister of Police and Counter Terrorism (U.K.)

The description of the TERRA indicators has been updated with recent literature (Beardsley, 2017; Bianchi, 2018; Entenmanns et.al, 2015; Hamm, 2013; Jeswal, 2013) and has included the work of the Council of Europe (2016), the European Commission (2018), the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network RAN (2018), the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2016), Europol (2017) and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation ICSR (2017).

Although radicalisation research has grown substantially over the years, still more research is needed to understand the causes, processes and mechanisms of radicalisation in order to be able to develop effective preventive and counter-measures (RAN Gap Analysis, 2016). The translation of this scientific knowledge into practical supportive material for





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professionals especially is still a big challenge. We hope to contribute to this aim with this document on risk indicators in prisons.



1. The process of radicalisation

In theory, we know why people become extremists and terrorists. There are several academic models which describe the process through which a normal civilian joins a violent extremist group.

Professor Fathali Moghaddam (Moghaddam, 2005) gives a valuable insight. His 2005 model gives a very clear overview of general motivations for radicalising. He argues that all people begin on the ground floor of his staircase model. If people feel that they are experiencing deprivation of some kind, especially if they think that the deprivation is caused by being part of an ethnic or religious group, they look for ways to overcome the deprivation. Often, they find a viable, legal solution. However, if no solution can be found, they can share their frustrations with members of the same group. This can strengthen the idea that the root of the problem is membership of a particular ethnic or religious group. Violent extremists claim to champion the cause of that group, offering what some people see as a solution to the problem.

Moghaddam's model takes the form of a staircase:



Extremist groups can appear to offer options for fighting unfair treatment. People who are frustrated and displaced can look for extremist groups – likewise, extremist groups are looking for people who are frustrated and displaced.

Professor Ari Kruglanski's work (Kruglanski et.al. 2014) offers another key insight into what drives people towards extremist groups. He has worked with a series of other academics to produce a model describing the "quest for significance." His work describes how all people have a deep psychological need to feel important. This sense of importance can be achieved in a variety of ways. It could be through having a prestigious job, feeling significant to one's family through their love and support, it might be through playing a key role in a social group. In cases in which this sense of significance is not naturally given by someone's family or social context, they may look for less orthodox means to achieve it. Joining extremist groups appear to offer an opportunity to contribute to a cause which is larger than oneself. In some cases, it may deliver a sense of significance through belonging. Skills or characteristics which are not valued by general society (a tendency to violence for example) may be welcomed and even celebrated by an extremist group. In the most extreme cases, a radicalised individual may even be prepared to sacrifice their life in the name of the cause and action which would, in their eyes, give immense significance to their death, a significance which they sought but could not find in life.

Martha Crenshaw (Crenshaw, 2011) analyses causes and processes of radicalisation, highlighting social and political problems. She breaks down the process of violent radicalisation into three categories:

- Situational: permissive and motivational pre-conditional factors, such as poverty or racial inequality, or anti state sentiments, for example.
- Strategic aims of the group, such as causing fear (short-term) or changing a political status-quo (long-term).
- Individual factors relating to motivation and participation in groups, such as psychological issues.

The Crenshaw model stresses that problems of terrorism and counterterrorism are closely related to other themes such as sovereignty, peacebuilding and political affairs. She reports:



“The first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority. A social movement develops in order to redress these grievances and to gain either equal rights or a separate state; terrorism is then the resort of an extremist faction of this broader movement. In practice, terrorism has frequently arisen in such situations: in modern states, separatist nationalism among Basques, Bretons, and Québécois motivated terrorism. In the colonial era, nationalist movements commonly turned to terrorism”

Crenshaw’s model suggests that, perceived injustice underlying deprivation gives rise to anger or frustration, providing a driving force towards becoming a violent extremist. She states that: “Terrorist violence communicates a political message” . Consequently:

“The second condition that creates motivations for terrorism is the lack of opportunity for political participation. Regimes that deny access to power and persecute dissenters create dissatisfaction. In this case, grievances are primarily political, without social or economic overtones”.

Terrorism may, Crenshaw suggests, be seen as an attractive strategy by groups who challenge the state's authority.

To summarise, we can draw some conclusions from the most recent literature which are highly relevant to radicalisation in prisons and therefore for professionals and volunteers working with prison populations. These are:

- Radicalisation is a process. This means that it develops in phases. This may happen very quickly, even in a matter of weeks, or may take much longer.
- Radicalisation often starts with a feeling of being isolated and marginalised.
- One of the motives for seeking connection with an extremist group can be a “search for significance.”
- It can be further driven by feelings of political injustice.

Prison staff and volunteers may recognise that this process is underway through visible changes in attitude, appearance and behaviour.

2. Dealing with radicalisation in prisons

There is concern that prisons are a breeding ground for radicalised violent extremism and that radicalised persons may not reintegrate into society after being released from prison (Council of Europe, 2016). Prisons are seen as places where radicalisation can take place, because of the vulnerability of its population. Inmates are vulnerable to outside influence because they often lack family support, supporting networks, are often marginalised in society, and may have identity issues and psychosocial problems. In addition, the prison environment can further exacerbate a personal crisis and a search for meaning and identity, which can be an open window for recruitment into extremism. Terrorists can see the time in prison as an opportunity to continue the battle and remain involved in terrorist activities. They want to vent their anger about a political cause they feel is right. They may refuse to cooperate with the authorities, thus helping to develop the strategy and ideology of the movement, and also mobilizing supporters and participating in violent campaigns.

Contrary to some populist opinion, religious conversion (including to Islam) is not problematic per se. On the other hand, overcrowded prisons, gang culture, racially segregated environments and insecurity inside prisons are all significant factors that contribute to the process of radicalisation and terrorism (Hamm, 2013).

Poor socioeconomic circumstances often have a negative impact on people and can be a contributing factor to crime. As explained above, when certain vulnerable individuals end up in prison, and meet with already radicalised inmates, they can themselves turn to extremism (Beardsley, 2017).

According to the data of Europol (Europol, 2017) the context of terrorism has great impact on prisons in Europe, with an increase in arrests and convictions for terrorism related offences. France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Belgium present the highest numbers. Again the situation in Europe differs tremendously: in some European countries the issue of radicalisation is not or hardly present, while other European countries are confronted with high numbers.

3. The role of prison staff

It's clear that people who work in prisons may be confronted either with people who have been convicted of terrorist offences, or people who have been convicted of other offences and are undergoing a process of radicalisation in prison. They are therefore uniquely placed to prevent radicalisation, to identify the problem if a process of radicalisation is taking place, and to take appropriate action if they suspect that this is so. Equally, it is very important that they do not misinterpret other signals (for example a conversion to a religious group) as a process of radicalisation, as this could potentially have a radicalising effect. In this section, we look at what we can derive from the state of the art of current literature, the knowledge we derive from research with practitioners in the field and the results of a recent European project, TERRA, which focused on producing an evidence based set of tools specifically designed for this professional group.

Looking at the literature and the expert opinions on the role of prisons, the overall view is that there are opportunities for combating radicalisation and terrorism amongst prison populations, and possibilities for peaceful change and transformation amongst them, supported by prison staff. However, some basic requirements are needed as a condition to make this possible. **For a healthy prison environment, all prisoners deserve respect. Trust between prisoners and staff must be fostered, and contact with family and friends should be allowed** (European Commission,2018).

First, we consider prevention within the context of the prison. In terms of general prevention, fostering an atmosphere of openness and transparency is crucial, as is providing support in developing positive identity attributes of the prisoner, such as fostering a professional development through education, or financial development through help with debt problems, for example. In general, trust between prisoners and prison staff is an important factor, creating an atmosphere where some kind of openness is possible. This is not an easy task, since detainees are, generally speaking, very angry and frustrated about society and the system as a whole. They generally do not trust others and (convicted terrorists in particular) sometimes have extensive experience with Intelligence Services. They are very aware of security issues. In the relationship with the detainee, it is therefore very important to be as transparent as possible. **In case of any communication regarding the detainee (telephone calls, letters, appointments, discussions etc. it is recommended to do this directly in his or**



her presence, so make the telephone call in their presence, let them read the letters being sent etc. This serves to avoid suspicion, foster transparency and build on trust.

Psychological counselling, which is often offered in European prisons, creates the opportunity for a longer relationship, with intensive conversations about world views, and in this way can explore the ideas prisoners have. Also in this context, the security issue is extremely important and should be shared from the beginning of the contacts between psychologist and detainee. **Transparency on this point is crucial. When information is shared by the detainee that poses an acute and concrete threat to society the psychologist can break the professional secrecy. This should be clear to the prisoner. In all other cases the psychologist is held to his/her professional secrecy.** Of course this is an extremely delicate and sensitive issue, which is complicated by different considerations. It should be handled with great integrity, so as to avoid unnecessarily violating the relationship between the prisoner and the staff.

Organised religious and interreligious programmes inside prisons and the presence of recognized religious leaders can give sound religious guidance and offer opportunities to explore life questions (Hamm, 2013). Identity issues and Kruglanski's "quest for significance," described above (Kruglanski, 2014), can both play a key role in a radicalisation process. Religion can help to provide answers to fundamental questions, bring structure and meaning and contribute to a process of recovery. It can also provide prisoners with a sense of community, especially attractive to prisoners who are for whatever reason, socially isolated.

The absence of official religious leaders on the other hand, could provide opportunities for already radicalised inmates to influence conversion routes and plant extremist ideas in prisoner's minds. **Organised religious and interreligious programmes and people capable of providing spiritual guidance to prisoners can play a valuable role in supporting positive development, and simultaneously reduce the opportunity for unofficial and occasionally radicalised spiritual leaders to spread extremist ideologies amongst prison populations.**

People serving a prison sentence are statistically much more likely than people outside of prison to convert to a new religion, with most of these conversions being to Islam. **It is very important to underline that conversion to a new religion or political group during or immediately after prison should not be seen as a cause for concern.** A prison term can, in some cases, be a time of change. It may be a moment of personal crisis. The need for physical safety can also make membership of a group seem attractive. Organised religious and spiritual

guidance within the prison can help to support conversion processes in a healthy, positive way. **Cases in which conversion to a new religion change into an affiliation with an extremist group are extremely rare.**

As part of re-integration into society, which should start already in prison, support in solving financial debts, housing issues etc. is a good angle of approach (Entenmanns et.al., 2015). Detainees are often motivated to collaborate, because it is practical and concrete help from which they can directly benefit. In this way, prison staff can connect with detainees in a positive way, mitigating the risks of negative impacts through this contact and accentuating the constructive role it can have. **Although this aspect of the work of prison staff may not seem directly connected to prevention of radicalisation, it can in fact be a powerful influencer, fostering trust, building the foundations for a positive future in which the prisoner will be less vulnerable to extremist influences, and directly opposing extremist narratives, which would have the listener believe that their social context bears them ill will and discriminates against them.**

The general context of the prison, then, can make a substantial contribution to prevention of radicalisation. There are occasions, however, when those in detention do find affiliation with an extremist group. Next, we are going to look at the role prison staff can play in identifying this process.

Radicalisation is a process of change, one which prison staff may be very well placed to identify. Prison staff come into frequent, often daily contact with a target group which might be vulnerable to radicalisation. This puts them in a good position to notice it. Changes can be seen in behaviour, appearance or the way they talk and socialise with their peer group. Prison staff may talk with prisoners and see them talking with others, hearing what's on their mind, and see their emotions when they talk about their situation or about the world around them. Staff know who their friends are, and can see if there is a change amongst a friendship group. In some cases, prisoners have access to education opportunities. For some inmates, this might be the first time they have had this opportunity. This, and meeting other prisoners with political views, can influence how they look at the world, or at themselves. They may take a political stand, or become friends with likeminded people. These changes may be visible to prison staff. Below, in the following section, we go into more detail on the indicators which might be visible during this process.

If prison staff have doubts about a prisoner and are concerned that a process of radicalisation may be underway, it is crucial that observations are shared with other professionals who are working on violent extremism and radicalisation, or who are also working closely with the prisoner concerned. In this way a multidisciplinary assessment and approach can be made. A potential process of radicalisation can be stopped or checked, thereby increasing security around the person it is believed may be radicalising, and perhaps even their safety too.

The points are ones to consider in terms of individual cases of radicalisation. Others come into play when we consider factors which may be influencing the broader population. The following issues are identified by Peter Neumann (2017), writing about prisons:

- Influence from outside

Most prisons screen the resources which are being sent to prisoners, but there have been a few cases in which prisoners have been contacted through a radical book, videos or websites. It is vital to stick to screening procedures and to investigate any instances where this has been a problem. It is important to report to law enforcement services that the prison and its inmates are being targeted by radical groups.
- Influence from outside

If known terrorists are kept within a prison, there is a higher risk factor within it. Terrorist prisoners can in some cases enjoy a hero status and use their influence to convert and convince their fellow inmates. In this situation, it is important to keep an eye on the social interactions of any such prisoners housed within your institution.
- Radical gangs

Gang culture has a long history within the prison system and seems to stem from a variety of factors, including the need for group protection of physical safety. There is some crossover between the development of gangs and that of radical groups, in that both offer their members security in numbers and a clear identity, sometimes lacking for prisoners.

In case prison staff notice any of these factors, it is important that attention is paid to them, and that they are discussed with the professional network, including social workers and religious leaders who provide care within the prison. Working in a multidisciplinary team helps to put together different kinds of information, to get the full picture and in this way come to a weighted judgement.

In conclusion, the professionals working in general population can make a valuable contribution to a stable and healthy environment, reducing the risk that prisoners serving time in general population become vulnerable to radicalisation during their sentence, combating radicalisation processes and supporting successful reintegration.

4. Risk indicators

First of all it is very important to underline that there is no checklist of symptoms which, if all the boxes are ticked, definitively say that someone is radicalising or is at a risk of becoming radicalised. But there are some signs which might indicate that a radicalisation process is underway. A radicalisation process can go very fast, taking place in a matter of weeks, or be a gradual development spread over years, or anything in between. Some people may display all of the behaviours in this manual, others just a few of them. Usually, just one of these changes or characteristics is not really cause for concern.

There are background factors that may increase the risk that someone may explore the path of radicalisation. We would like to emphasize that those background factors do not automatically direct someone in a dangerous direction. A quest for identity for example is quite normal at a certain age. It is nevertheless important to be aware of those factors. It will help to take a more focused approach.

Individuals who may be vulnerable to the influence of extremist groups may be:

- Searching for an identity. Extremist groups, which deliver clear rules on how to behave and dress, and even what kind of music to listen to, can be very attractive to someone who is seeking a way to belong.
- Brought up in an environment where violence is an accepted means to solve problems or display power.

- Connected to someone within an extremist group. If a sibling, parent, close friend or fellow inmate is known to be a member of a radicalised group, the influence on the individual the group will be much stronger. Be aware that this person runs a higher risk of becoming radicalised.
- The victim of discrimination. If someone has experienced racism or seen that another ethnic, religious or political group has received preferential treatment, they are likely to feel resentful.
- Have strong political views, and feelings of international injustice.

Individual factors, furthermore, can fuel the process of radicalisation. A first step on the path to radicalisation is often caused by feelings of frustration. People feel stuck in their situation, and they try to find a way to get a better grip on their lives. This implies moving away from the mainstream, looking for groups which do provide a feeling that they are able to address their troubles in a powerful way. They are open for extremist ideas, they may:

- Feel that they have not achieved goals or successes they wanted because of racism or other forms of discrimination.
- Show a loss of sense of legitimacy in authority (police, government etc.).
- Show strong feelings about group identities and develop a sense of competition between groups, talking strongly in terms of us versus them.
- Be especially receptive to ideas from people or groups who share their negative experience of the wider society. Others who recognise the sense of being disadvantaged and who talk about fighting it, will be especially attractive, new friendships develop.

Look for a group which provides a very clear identity, sometimes implying changes in dress, haircut, tattoos etc.

In a survey executed under the FAIR project (2018) under prison staff the following signs of radicalisation were mentioned: intensive writing about extremist ideologies (97), intensive reading on extremist ideologies (93), forming/joining a group (82), speaking out worldviews (73), isolating oneself (66), new tattoos connected to ideologies (61), aggression (55), intensifying of praying behaviour (52), stigmatizing other prisoners (52), changing diet (38), increasing contact through mail (34), blocking out family (32), music (28), drug use (12). A following question about the stigmatizing effect of these indicators show that prison staff is

not convinced this is the case, but it is stressed that a right interpretation of the indicators is crucial. (See Annex 1).

Recommendations for professionals and volunteers working with people in prison populations:

- Show an interest in hobbies and talents of the individual. Sporting, artistic or musical talents can all provide a positive identity, and a potential social group. Be extra alert to someone who has social or familial connections to an extremist group. Where possible, discuss their family or social situation with them. Discuss this case with other professionals.
- Respond proactively to any reports of racism or discrimination. Again, discuss these cases with the other staff members.
- In cases in which discrimination has taken place, make it clear to the person reporting it that legitimate means to redressing the balance are available, and make sure that these are followed through. People who have experienced discrimination, sometimes have the tendency to feel that the negative emotions expressed by the person who discriminated against them are common to their entire social group. Ensure that you underline that the discrimination they have experienced is a one off, individual action.
- As far as possible, keep talking with the person. The processes at stake here are mainly psychological ones, not yet really resulting in any action. Support at this moment could be really important in stopping the process.
- If appropriate to the situation, connecting the person with role models he can easily identify with can be a very positive step. This can challenge the idea that a lack of success can be attributed to discrimination.
- Challenge a sense of us versus them. Always focus on the common ground between groups. Lay emphasis on the positive aspects of the group which the person feels is discriminated against. Support critical thinking, especially about extremist groups which the person may come into contact with.

5. The use of risk indicators and violent extremism risk assessment tools

Risk indicators are often used in the framework of Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Tools. Prison Administration in some European Member States use them with the aim of carrying out monitoring activity for intelligence and terrorism prevention purposes. Risk indicators may be used to prevent and counter radicalisation and/or to prevent and counter terrorism. Their use, however, is not itself without risk, as misuse can lead to the creation of stigma unless some principles are followed during the assessment.¹

As we have stressed several times throughout this document, religious conversion or commitment should never be seen as a cause for concern. On the contrary, religious engagement could be also a signal of a spiritual empowerment and rehabilitation of self-personal condition. As RAN underlines: “Labelling ‘violent extremists’ or ‘terrorists’ might not do justice to the different profiles in this group. The challenge around prosecuting and detaining foreign fighters is an example of this. It is therefore important that assessments are repeated at regular intervals or at times of change, in order to illustrate a possible reduction in the level of risk that a particular offender may show as an evolution of his/her disengagement process.”²

The indicators should be read and analysed by the penitentiary police and the internal staff only with strong cognitive tools and knowledge of violent extremism, engagement and disengagement processes in a well-defined framework for the purpose of investigation.

Furthermore, what emerges is that in many countries compulsory and guaranteed, *ad hoc* training courses for all prison staff are not structured and organized as a part of the penitentiary system. We are also aware of the effort of some European projects to create a shared risk assessment tool. Every effort seems to be stuck in the difficulty of sharing sensitive data, of going beyond national fences. Even more contradictory, sometimes different agencies within a same country make use of different risk assessment tools.

Recommendations:

- FAIR would recommend the adoption of both the RAN guiding principle: “Universal human rights conventions must be respected”³ in prison and probation practices to avoid counterproductive effects on inmates, and the RAN statement:

¹ CoE Guidelines 2016 and general guidelines from RAN

² Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context. RAN P&P – practitioners working paper

³ Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context. RAN P&P - practitioners working paper



"an accurate assessment must consider the range of motivations and circumstances that contribute to the radicalisation"⁴.

- The potentially harmful aspects named above may hamper accurate risk assessment without a specific training. All staff who come into contact with inmates should be trained through specific courses. Successful use of these tools require that the observations are validated by multi-disciplinary teams.
- Risk indicator and Assessment tools for inmates convicted or accused of terrorism-related facts should take into account whether the subjects show signs of DE radicalization/disengagement.

6. Radicalised inmates

An inmate who is frustrated and marginalised, seeking ways in which to redress the balance of what they see as unfair treatment in society may come into contact with groups who are actively seeking new recruits. At this point in the process, the demand meets the need: a group provides a means to address the perceived unfairness of society. This is a very crucial point in the process. Once they get involved with a group, it will become harder to go back. At this point, several changes may come to the surface.

Possible indicators:

- Change in appearance. Once a group has been selected, the recruit tends to make support of it really visible. This might include adopting a certain style of dress, letting a beard grow, or indeed shaving off all hair, displaying flags or stickers, getting tattoos which show their membership. These changes may be visible in someone within the prison system as well, even though in some prisons the inmates wear uniforms. Using vocabulary typical to the group is also common, for example names for certain ethnic or religious groups.
- Change in identity, even in name, can take place.
- Change in behaviour. In an attempt to affirm membership of the group, changes in behaviour such as changing diet, may be noticeable. They may be very expressive

⁴ Conference paper- European Commission-DG Justice "Radicalisation in prisons", 27/02/2018, Brussels.



in support of the ideology of the group, and even challenge non-members who do not follow the behaviour suggested by the group.

- Change in daily routine: refusal to participate in daily activities (work, school, sport), the tendency to isolation, refusal to take a shower, to eat, to use prison linen, to share the detention chamber and the common rooms with non-Muslim prisoners.
- Trying to convince other prisoners to follow an extreme interpretation of “political” ideologies.
- Change in friendship group. Individuals who have become involved with an extremist group tend to withdraw from the social and leisure activities they used to do, becoming increasingly involved in activities connected with the group. This may include forming a new group of friends
- They are very clear in the definition of their own group in comparison to others. Sometimes they speak or behave in a threatening way about other groups. Forcing group rules on others, and participating in closed meetings.
- Behaviour towards other people, this may for example be visible in the relationship with prison staff, outspokenness about a political cause or conversely no dialogue, the way they relate to female prison staff in the case of a male inmate or male staff in the case of a female inmate may change.
- Outspokenness on political events: expression of complacency on the occasion of disasters in Western countries, or during terrorist attacks, criticism towards Western intervention in Muslim countries and towards governments and democratic systems, or other religions.
- Changes in religious practice: this may be visible in intensification or reduction in the mode of prayer, a preference for isolation during prayer, or conversely the role assumed in the prayer group (guide, imam or participant), acceptance or refusal of accredited imams. Small groups may be formed by informal religious leaders.
- Change in attitude towards prayer; does an inmate try to impose prayer upon other inmates, expressions of discrimination against moderate Muslims.
- Indicators in the organisation of the detention room, the presence of prayer rugs, articles, photos, writing on walls, rejection of television in the room.

- Later in the phases of radicalisation, an inmate may abandon a more extreme look in an attempt to blend in with peers, so as to escape the notice of law enforcement. Convicted terrorists have vast experience with intelligence services and the way they operate. They are keen to hide their thoughts and actions. These inmates can show super adjusted behaviour, which makes it extremely difficult for prison staff to identify them as extremists.

Recommendations for professionals and volunteers working with people in prison populations:

- Raise awareness amongst prison population as a whole about the tactics which extremist groups can use to recruit people, especially the use of shocking and biased narratives. These only present one side of the story and it's important to think critically about them.
- If someone identifies someone who is radicalising, the team of psychologists, psychiatrist, mentor, imam, sometimes medical service and management, or others like prison educators and adult education teachers should come together to discuss the issue and come to an assessment, an interpretation of the signals which have been identified. What is already clear and what kind of information is still missing?
- If one feels that an individual is being targeted by recruiters other staff members should be involved to assess the situation and develop an intervention plan.
- Try to prevent the individual from becoming increasingly isolated. Maintain communication as much as possible. Discuss worldviews, focus on their healthy sides and approach them as equals.
- Try to build longer lasting relationships; the position of psychologists and religious leaders are especially well suited to doing so. Having regular, confidential conversations about worldviews, over a longer period of time, can challenge extremist ideas and encourage a more open-minded perspective.
- Chaplaincy can help with religious education, which can challenge extremist ideas by providing alternatives.
- Offer a customized intervention plan. This should focus on learning how to ask for help, how to show a vulnerable side and should include the social system in the

treatment plan. Therapy can help to develop ones identity as a person and as a citizen, regulate aggression and provide trauma treatment and practical support.

- Rehabilitation programs can address and prevent radicalisation in prisons by providing alternatives. Rehabilitation programs can start in various phases of the imprisonment, and might offer individuals a way out of terrorist networks, which they often find very hard to leave behind if no support is provided.
- Social support provided by a mentor, and maintaining ties with family and friends can help to bridge the transition from prison to release and integration with society.
- Staff should follow training on indicators of radicalisation and how to use them.

7. Recruitment in prison

Recruiters can be very active in prison. Convicted terrorists and radicalised individuals can see their time in prison as an opportunity to continue the battle and stay involved in terrorist activities, for example recruitment for their extremist groups and ideology (Jeswal, 2013). On the basis of their experience helping foreign fighters to travel to the conflict zones, and their international network they are in the perfect position to share these experiences with vulnerable inmates. These recruiters often have a good sense of those who are vulnerable. This can be because of the position they have in prison, often isolated and the lowest in rank. Recruiters are skilled in building individual relationships. They offer a human and personal contact, often offering help and support, often acting as a kind of mentor or father figure. Spending time with vulnerable inmates and carrying out conversations with them can provide a seemingly innocent cover for an attempt to convert them to their ideology. They are often capable of operating in a very subtle way. For prison staff this is very hard to identify.

In some situations, the prison population can be very hierarchical. This is difficult to combat, but can mean that prisoners on the lowest levels of the hierarchy can be additionally isolated and vulnerable. It is worthwhile to be aware that these people can be extra vulnerable to extremist messages and can be explicitly targeted by recruiters.

It has also been known for radical groups to target prisons for recruitment by attempting to contact the prisoners with extremist material, specifically books and other writing.



On some occasions, terrorists have been known to create cells within the prisons. This can make detecting terrorist activity very difficult but can be seen in changes of friendship groups or within group dynamics. Any such changes should be considered to be potentially significant.

Conclusion

This manual is aimed at prison staff working in prisons in European countries in the context of prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism. It gives some guidance on what indicators of radicalisation are, how to identify them and what they tell us.

We realise that developing this manual for so many different countries is an ambitious goal. Prison regimes differ between European countries, laws and regulations differ, and the issue of radicalisation and terrorism is not as big a problem in every country.

The countries therefore present differing levels of awareness of the issue and various levels of experience amongst staff. As a consequence the needs of prison staff also vary from country to country – however, in spite of these differences, a needs assessment executed in the partnering countries of the project clearly illustrated a shared need for further information and training.

The manual provides information on models of radicalisation, which help to understand the process of radicalisation, it gives a description of the possible risk indicators, and it gives a first guidance on how to deal with them. It is important to stress that the indicators should be used with caution and in cooperation with various staff members.

Everything points towards prison staff and volunteers being able to play a crucial role in preventing, signalling and tackling radicalisation amongst prison populations. We include all staff who come into professional contact with prisoners, including warders, psychologists, psychiatrists, medical staff, religious leaders, mentors and educators of all kinds. It is therefore crucial that this important professional group is fully up to date on the state of the art



regarding trends in radicalisation and has full access to information on it and the roles they can potentially play.

Finally, we can indicate some clear Do's and Don'ts for prison staff and volunteers.

Don't:

- Assume that a conversion to Islam or any other religion is a cause of concern. Doing so can have a serious consequence in initiating or accelerating a radicalisation process.
- Fall into the trap of prejudice or discrimination.
- Engage in confrontations. Instead, try to initiate open conversations.
- Neglect indicators, once they are confirmed, but also;
- Use these risk indicators as a straightforward checklist. It is not intended as such.

Do:

- Be aware that radicalisation may be an issue in your prison.
- Be aware that changes in appearance, attitude and behaviour may be caused by radicalisation.
- Check materials which are being sent into the prison, and ensure that the prisoners do not have access to extremist material from outside.
- Use a multidisciplinary approach.
- Keep up to date about what kinds of appearance, attitude and behaviour may signal radicalisation. This can differ from country to country and even from region to region.
- Make use of rehabilitation programmes, where available, as early in the sentence as possible.
- Be transparent;
- Actively work towards building an atmosphere of trust.



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This Manual on Risk Indicators Radicalisation in prisons is developed under the FAIR project, Fighting Inmates 'Radicalisation, and is meant to support prison staff in raising awareness around the issue of radicalisation in prisons, to help them identify the signals of radicalisation, to prevent further radicalisation and to develop policies and interventions which can contribute to a climate in prisons which supports this prevention.



Annex 1

Results of the survey for prison personnel on prevention of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Finland, Portugal, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania and Italy (Question 30 & 31).

Question 30

In your opinion, what are signs/indicators of (potential) radicalisation? Multiple answers are possible.

Country	Signs of radicalisation
Finland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Isolating oneself 34 - (Intensive) writing about extremist ideologies 54 - Music 19 - Stigmatizing of other prisoners 28 - Speaking out worldview 54 - (Intensive) reading on extremist ideologies 53 - Aggression 28 - Changing diet 26 - Forming/joining group 51 - Increasing contact through mail 26 - Blocking out family 14 - (New) tattoo(s) connected to ideologies 43 - Drug use 3 - Intensifying of praying behaviour 30 <p>Others: writing on the cell wall, celebrating terrorist attacks, pictures related to ideology found in the cell and individual factors.</p>
Portugal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Isolating oneself 12 - (Intensive) writing about extremist ideologies 12 - Music 4 - Stigmatizing of other prisoners 7 - Speaking out worldview 4 - (Intensive) reading on extremist ideologies 11 - Aggression 6 - Changing diet 4 - Forming/joining group 9 - Increasing contact through mail 0 - Blocking out family 9 - (New) tattoo(s) connected to ideologies 9 - Drug use 2 - Intensifying of praying behaviour 4

<p>Slovenia</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Isolating oneself 7 - (Intensive) writing about extremist ideologies 9 - Music 1 - Stigmatizing of other prisoners 7 - Speaking out worldview 0 - (Intensive) reading on extremist ideologies 9 - Aggression 5 - Changing diet 0 - Forming/joining group 8 - Increasing contact through mail 0 - Blocking out family 1 - (New) tattoo(s) connected to ideologies 1 - Drug use 1 - Intensifying of praying behaviour 1
<p>Hungary</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Isolating oneself 6 - (Intensive) writing about extremist ideologies 4 - Music 2 - Stigmatizing of other prisoners 5 - Speaking out worldview 8 - (Intensive) reading on extremist ideologies 5 - Aggression 2 - Changing diet 1 - Forming/joining group 5 - Increasing contact through mail 2 - Blocking out family 2 - (New) tattoo(s) connected to ideologies 0 - Drug use 4 - Intensifying of praying behaviour 4
<p>Lithuania</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Isolating oneself 2 - (Intensive) writing about extremist ideologies 6 - Music 1 - Stigmatizing of other prisoners 2 - Speaking out worldview 0 - (Intensive) reading on extremist ideologies 5 - Aggression 7 - Changing diet 3 - Forming/joining group 4 - Increasing contact through mail 0 - Blocking out family 1 - (New) tattoo(s) connected to ideologies 4 - Drug use 0 - Intensifying of praying behaviour 3

<p>Netherlands</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Isolating oneself 1 - (Intensive) writing about extremist ideologies 1 - Music 1 - Stigmatizing of other prisoners 1 - Speaking out worldview 1 - (Intensive) reading on extremist ideologies 1 - Aggression 1 - Changing diet 1 - Forming/joining group 1 - Increasing contact through mail 1 - Blocking out family 1 - (New) tattoo(s) connected to ideologies 0 - Drug use 1 - Intensifying of praying behaviour 1
<p>Romania</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Isolating oneself 4 - (Intensive) writing about extremist ideologies 11 - Music 0 - Stigmatizing of other prisoners 2 - Speaking out worldview 6 - (Intensive) reading on extremist ideologies 9 - Aggression 6 - Changing diet 3 - Forming/joining group 4 - Increasing contact through mail 5 - Blocking out family 4 - (New) tattoo(s) connected to ideologies 4 - Drug use 1 - Intensifying of praying behaviour 9
<p>Italy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Isolating oneself 2 - (Intensive) writing about extremist ideologies 0 - Music 0 - Stigmatizing of other prisoners 0 - Speaking out worldview 0 - (Intensive) reading on extremist ideologies 1 - Aggression 2 - Changing diet 0 - Forming/joining group 0 - Increasing contact through mail 0 - Blocking out family 1 - (New) tattoo(s) connected to ideologies 0 - Drug use 0 - Intensifying of praying behaviour 1

	Others: The majority of Italian respondents preferred not to answer this question because they do not know the phenomenon of radicalization or its signals. Respondents answered 4 out of 13.
Malta	Information not available

Most common signs of radicalisation

Intensive writing about extremist ideologies	97
Intensive reading on extremist ideologies	94
Forming / joining group	82
Speaking out Worldview	73
Isolating oneself	68
New tattoos connected to ideologies	61
Aggression	57
Intensifying of praying behaviour	53
Stigmatizing other prisoners	52
Changing diet	38
Increasing contact through mail	34
Blocking out family	33
Music	28
Drug use	12

These are the signs of radicalisation according to the survey developed under the FAIR project

Question 31

Does the use of the abovementioned indicators cause stigmatization?

Finland

22 out of 54 think that the abovementioned indicators do mean stigmatization, whereas other 32 don't.

Portugal

8 of 14 think that the abovementioned indicators do mean stigmatization, whereas other 6 don't.

Slovenia

6 out of 10 think that determining people according to the abovementioned indicators does not mean stigmatization, but they consider that they are already stigmatizing with such labelling.

Italy

100% ensures that is vital to know the right interpretation of the indicators in order to not stigmatize the inmates.

Netherlands

The respondent thinks that the above-mentioned indicators do mean stigmatization.

Romania

3 of the 12 think that the abovementioned indicators do mean stigmatization, whereas other 9 don't.

Malta

Information not available.

Hungary

Information not available.

Lithuania

Information not available.

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